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THE WILLIAMSON STANDARD FOR THE
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY FOR STATEMENTS
AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Williamson v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
defined the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3)'s (Rule
804(b) (3)) exception from the rule against hearsay for statements
that subject a declarant to criminal liability.2 Rule 804(b) (3) reads:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:... (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declar-
ant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declar-
ant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and of-
fered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Rule 804(b) (3) "permits the introduction of statements against penal
interest-defined as statements tending to subject the declarant to
criminal liability."3 When used as evidence in a criminal trial, these
statements may be exculpatory-tending to exonerate the defend-
ant-or inculpatory-tending to implicate the defendant.
4
In Williamson, the Court held that statements against interest are
admissible only if they are individually self-inculpatory as to the declar-
ant.5 In the majority's view, non-self-inculpatory statements (de-
scribed as collateral statements in the parlance of Rule 804(b) (3)) are
not admissible even if the declarant made them within a broader nar-
1 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
2 FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (3).
3 Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatoy Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confironta-
tion Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 159, 159 (1983).
4 Id.
5 Williamson, 114 S. Ct at 2435.
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rative that is generally self-inculpatory.6 Justice Kennedy argued in his
concurrence that collateral statements, as well as individual statements
against interest, are admissible.
7
This Note argues that the majority correctly adopted a narrow
interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3). The Court's approach properly en-
sures the reliability of statements against interest by focusing on the
rationale underlying the rule-that reasonable persons do not make
statements against their penal interest unless they believe those state-
ments to be true.8
II. BACKGROUND
Hearsay-defined as the in-court repetition of an out-of-court
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted-is not
generally admissible as evidence. 9 The rule prohibiting the admission
of hearsay reflects concerns about its trustworthiness and reliability.' 0
Unlike in-court testimony, hearsay statements are not usually given
under oath or solemn affirmation and are not subject to cross-exami-
nation by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity,
and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant.1 In short, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible because it is not possible to subject it to in-
court procedures designed to ensure the reliability of evidence.
12
A. THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY FOR
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
Exceptions to the rule against hearsay allow courts to admit cer-
tain hearsay statements that display indicia of reliability sufficient to
overcome the dangers typically posed by hearsay.'3 Even though com-
mon law courts did not recognize an exception for declarations
6 1& For a discussion of the distinction between collateral and noncollateral inculpa-
tory statements, see United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1381 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981) (defin-
ing "noncollateral inculpatory statements" as statements in which the "facts inculpating the
defendant are found in the portion of the statement directly against the declarant's inter-
est," and 'collateral inculpatory statements' as "statements" in which "the inculpatory mate-
rial is not found in the portion of the statement directly against the declarant's interest,
but appears instead in another portion of the statement.").
7 Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2445.
8 FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3).
9 Jay L. Hack, Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an
Emerging Majority Rue, 56 B.U. L. REv. 148 (1976).
10 VJOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EvwENcE N TRILus AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at 3 (James H.
Chadbourne rev., 1974).
11 1&
12 David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Crimi-
nal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Haav. L. REv. 1378, 1378 (1972).
13 Hack, supra note 9.
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against penal interest, the exceptions for declarations that directly af-
fected the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest form the foun-
dation for Rule 804(b) (3) .14 Under this exception, common law
courts admitted statements if. (1) the declarant was dead; (2) the dec-
laration was against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declar-
ant; (3) the declaration was of a fact immediately cognizable by the
declarant personally; and (4) the declarant had no motive to falsify
the fact declared. 15
Traditionally, courts viewed inculpatory statements against penal
interest as unreliable for three reasons. 16 First, the psychological
premise that reasonable persons will not make a statement against
their penal interest, although perhaps true as a generalization, can
break down when applied to a specific individual.' 7 Second, most
statements inculpating a defendant are collateral to the portion of the
statement that is against the declarant's interest.' 8 Following this ar-
gument, the portion of the statement that specifically implicates the
defendant is rarely against the declarant's penal interest, thereby
weakening the inference that the statement is trustworthy. 19 Third,
the declarant may often be motivated either to make false statements
to curry favor with the authorities, or to shift or share blame for a
crime.20 Because of these factors, courts at common law were reluc-
tant to expand the rule admitting statements against interest to in-
clude inculpatory statements against penal interest.2 1 In 1913, the
Supreme Court, in Donnelly v. United States,22 adopted the early Eng-
lish precedents against admitting statements against penal interests.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
804(b) (3)
In 1969, the Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure completed its first draft of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.23 The Committee departed from the common
law rule of Donnelly and instituted an exception for statements against
penal interest in response to "an increasing amount of decisional law
14 Id.
15 Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1944).




20 Id. at 163-64.
21 Id. at 164.
22 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
28 Keller, supra note 3, at 174.
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recognizi[ing that] exposure to punishment for crime" was a sufficient
guarantor of evidentiary reliability.24 The Committee sided with Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent in Donnelly and agreed that the common law's
refusal to allow the introduction of any statement against penal inter-
est could not be reconciled with a rule allowing the admission of state-
ments against pecuniary or proprietary interests.25
However, the Committee refused to allow the admission of state-
ments against penal interest that inculpated the defendant, citing
their inherent evidentiary unreliability.26 Pointing out that "state-
ments of codefendants have traditionally been regarded with suspi-
cion because of the readily supposed advantages of implicating
another," the Committee explicitly limited the new federal hearsay ex-
ception in the last line of the rule: "[T]his example does not include
a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal
case, made by a co-defendant or other person implicating both him-
self and the accused."
27
When the Supreme Court issued the official draft of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, it omitted the restriction against inculpa-
tory statements against penal interest from Rule 804(b) (3). The ac-
companying Advisory Committee Note (Committee Note) explained
that such inculpatory statements could qualify as statements against
interest within the meaning of the Rule.28 Although the House of
Representatives sought to bar the admission of inculpatory statements
against penal interest,29 the Senate rejected that limitation on the
hearsay exception.30 The Senate's view prevailed in Conference, and
the Conference Report explained that "[t]he Conferees agree[d] to
delete the provision regarding statements by a co-defendant, thereby
reflecting the general approach in the Rules of Evidence to avoid at-
tempting to codify the constitutional evidentiary principles."3 ' The
24 Id. at 175.
25 Id. See also, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913).
26 Keller, supra note 3, at 175.
27 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969).
28 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321,
327-28 (1972).
29 See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973), finted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN.
7075, 7089-90.
so See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN.
7051, 7067-68.
31 H.R. CoN . REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CAN. 7075, 7089-90; see also SENATE Comm. ON THEJUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FED-
ERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7068 (1974), reprinted in




Conference Committee, focusing on the Constitutional right to con-
frontation, concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) should not exclude incul-
patory statements against interest.
3 2
Currently, the text of Rule 804(b) (3) discusses exculpatory state-
ments, but is silent as to the admissibility of inculpatory statements
against penal interest.33 The Committee Note following the Rule,
however, states that "[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought
of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always
or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him,
and under the general theory of declarations against interest they
would be admissible as related statements."3 4 The Committee Note
goes on to state that neither Douglas v. Alabama35 nor Bruton v. United
States36 "require[s] that all statements implicating another person be
excluded from the category of declarations against interest."37 As a
rationale for including declarations against penal interest within the
common law exception for statements against interest, the Committee
Note affirms that exposure to criminal liability satisfies the against-
interest requirement.38 The Committee Note emphasizes the impor-
tant need to consider the circumstances surrounding the statements
and warns against statements made in custody that may have been at-
tempts to curry favor with the authorities.
3 9
C. CASE LAW INTERPRETING RULE 804(b) (3)
In its final form, Rule 804(b) (3) states that the hearsay rule does
not exclude "a statement which.., at the time of its making... so far
tended to subject [the declarant] to ... criminal liability ... that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made
the statement unless believing it to be true." Since the adoption of
Rule 804(b) (3) in 1975, lower federal court opinions have consid-
ered,40 and in some cases admitted, inculpatory statements against pe-
nal interest as a valid exception to the hearsay rule.41 In 1978, the
Fifth Circuit proposed a three-part test in United States v. Alvarez.42
32 Keller, supra note 3, at 177-78.
33 Id. at 178.
34 FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. at 790-92.
35 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
36 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
37 FED. R. EvID 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. at 790-92.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1382 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630-32 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980).
42 584 F.2d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Riley, 657 F.2d at 1382-83, and United
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The defendant in Alvarez had been convicted of heroin trafficking af-
ter the introduction of an incriminating statement made by a man
who was dead at the time of the trial.43 The Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court and determined that the out-of-court statements of the
alleged accomplice were untrustworthy and were inadmissible as dec-
larations against penal interest.44 The Court in Alvarez held that a
statement against interest may be admissible when: (1) the declarant
is unavailable; (2) the statement so far tends to subject the declarant
to criminal liability "that a reasonable [person] in his position would
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true;" and (3)
if the declarant offered the statement to exculpate the accused, there
are circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness. 45 This test sets
forth the most specific standards any lower federal court has used for
the admission of an inculpatory statement against penal interest.
46
Courts of Appeals have on numerous occasions upheld the admis-
sion of inculpatory statements made to the police by accomplices, but
only after satisfying themselves that the statements were genuinely
against the declarant's interest. For example, in United States v. Coach-
man 7 an accomplice pleaded guilty prior to trial to a charge of de-
frauding the government, but refused to testify against the defendant.
Applying Rule 804(b) (3), the Court of Appeals approved the admis-
sion against the defendant of "a Secret Service agent's recapitulation
of an inculpatory statement made by [the accomplice] after his
arrest" 48 The court recognized that "[w]hether a statement is in fact
against interest depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case." 49 Although it was "mindful ... that an in-custody statement
which inculpates another as well as the speaker may have been made
with a view to currying favor with law-enforcement authorities,"50 after
analyzing the surrounding circumstances, it found no such danger in
the accomplice's confession because his "version [of the crime] did
not attempt to trivialize his own involvement in the nefarious scheme
by shifting responsibility to his cohorts; rather, it frankly disclosed the
extent of his own participation without any effort to demonstrate that
others were really the ones to blame."51 Thus, the court concluded
States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1980).
43 Alvare, 584 F.2d at 695.
44 Id at 701-02.
45 Id. at 699.
46 Keller, supra note 3, at 178.
47 727 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48 R at 1296.
49 Id.
50 Id
51 Id at 1297.
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that the accomplice's statement satisfied the rule because it was genu-
inely against his penal interest.
52
Similarly, Courts of Appeals have refused to admit evidence as
statements against penal interest by an accomplice because they were
not sufficiently contrary to the declarant's penal interest, under the
circumstances of a particular case, so that a reasonable person would
not have made them unless believing the statements to be true.53
In cases involving collateral statements, some Courts of Appeals
have admitted such statements provided that they are "sufficiently in-
tegral" to the entirety of statements against interest.54 In support of
this approach, the Second Circuit stated:
[e]ven if [the statement] were wholly neutral, however, it could consti-
tute a statement against interest within the meaning of Rule 804(b) (3)
52 Id See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1990) (co-de-
fendant's post-arrest statement to authorities that he and defendant were both involved in
drug conspiracy); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (2d Cir. 1989) (state-
ment made in Greece by defendant's father-in-law to FBI implicating himself and defend-
ant in violation of Greek and American law); United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 348-49
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1022 (1989) (upholding admission of co-defendant's
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy that implicated defendant); United States v. Carruth, 699 F.2d
1017, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1983) (statement of defendant's accountant to IRS agent implicat-
ing both co-defendant and defendant in tax fraud), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984);
United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir.) (non-custodial statement by co-
defendant and defendant in drug conspiracy, declarant received "no promises" or reason
to expect leniency and made no effort "to shift the balance [of culpability] elsewhere"),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); United States v. Winley, 638 F.2d 560, 562 (2d. Cir. 1981)
(same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1982); cf. Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1504-06
(10th Cir. 1991) (upholding admission under OxA.& STAT. ANN . tit. 12, § 2804(B) (3) of
statement of robbery victim's son-in-law to state officer that he had told the defendant
about the floor plan of victim's home).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Magana-Olvera, 917 F.2d 401, 407-09 (9th Cir. 1990) (state-
ments were not sufficiently against declarant's penal interest where they were made in
custody after government suggested that he could cut his prison time in half for coopera-
tion, and where statements "trivialized [the declarant's] role in the drug conspiracy");
United States v.Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding inadmissible teen-
ager's post-arrest statement trivializing his own role in narcotics offense and implicating an
older man and store owner as "the kingpin in a drug operation"); United States v.
Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir.) (excluding statements based on "the totality of
'circumstances of [this] case'"), cert. denied; 454 U.S. 819 (1981); United States v. Love, 592
F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that declarant's statement did not subject her to
criminal liability); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (declar-
ant had been convicted and given immunity when he made statements at issue).
54 United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Admitting the
entire statement even though it contains a reference to others is particularly appropriate
when that reference is closely connected to the reference to the declarant"); United States
v. IAeberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding statement which on its own was not
damaging to be against interest because it was probative of declarant's knowledge of the
crime); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926
(1980); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 1976) (admitting a collateral
statement that was arguably disserving because it strengthened the impression that he had
an insider's knowledge of the crimes).
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since it was part and parcel of a larger conversation in which clearly self-
incriminating statements were made: "it suffices for admission under
that rule that a remark which is itself neutral as to the declarant's inter-
est be integral to a larger statement which is against the declarant's
interest."
55
In Lieberman, a prosecution for a conspiracy to distribute marijuana,
the Second Circuit addressed the admissibility of two related state-
ments under Rule 804(b) (3). First, the court determined that the de-
clarant's statement that he had packed certain boxes was clearly self-
inculpatory because the boxes contained marijuana.5 6 In the second
statement, the declarant admitted that the defendant had told him
not to open the door of the storeroom for anyone.57 Although the
court determined that the second statement was less damaging to the
declarant, it held that the statement was self-incriminating because it
was probative of the declarant's knowledge of the furtive nature of his
activities.58 The court further reasoned that the second statement was
admissible because it was "part and parcel" of the larger conversation
that was self-inculpatory.59
Other Courts of Appeals have rejected the "substantially integral"
test regarding collateral statements and have instead held that only
self-inculpatory statements are admissible.60 United States v. Lilley in-
volved a prosecution for publishing a forged treasury check.61 The
lower court allowed a federal agent to recount a statement made by
the defendant's husband, on the ground that he was unavailable as a
witness under spousal immunity.62 In the statement at issue, the hus-
band admitted to forging a signature on an income tax refund, but
also inculpated the defendant (his wife) in the forgery.63 The Eighth
Circuit reversed the lower court and held that the "small portion of
Mr. Lilley's statement which was against his interest should have been
excluded absent severability from those portions of the statement in-
culpating the accused."64 The court reasoned that the portions of the
declarant's statement which inculpated the defendant, but did not
tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability (in other words, col-
lateral statements) were not contrary enough to the declarant's inter-
55 United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing United States v.
Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980)).




60 United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1978).
61 I&
62 Id.
63 I& at 186-87.
64 Id. at 188.
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ests that a reasonable person would not have made them unless he
believed them to be true.
65
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 26 March 1989, a deputy sheriff in Dooly County, Georgia,
stopped Reginald Harris for weaving his rental car on the highway.66
Harris consented to a search of the vehicle, during which the deputy
sheriff discovered nineteen kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in
the trunk.67 Several items discovered during the search connected
Harris with the petitioner, Fredel Williamson. 68 The deputy sheriff
found an envelope addressed to Williamson, and a receipt bearing
Williamson's girlfriend's address inside the glove compartment.69 In
addition, the suitcases containing the cocaine bore the initials of Wil-
liamson's sister, and the car rental agreement listed Williamson as an
additional driver.
70
Over the next several hours, the police arrested Harris and inter-
rogated him twice. 71 Shortly after the arrest, Special Agent Donald
Walton of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) interviewed Harris by
telephone. 72 During that conversation, Agent Walton informed Har-
ris that he would relay any cooperation Harris provided to the prose-
cuting attorney.73 After asking whether Agent Walton was recording
the call and receiving a negative response, Harris told Agent Walton
that he obtained the cocaine from an unidentified Cuban man in Fort
Lauderdale and that the cocaine belonged to petitioner Williamson.74
He further stated that he was supposed to deliver the cocaine to a
dumpster in Atlanta later that night.75
Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in person.76 As
in the first interview, Agent Walton told Harris that he would docu-
ment any cooperation Harris provided and relay it to the prosecu-
tor.7 7 During the second interview, Harris said he had rented the car
a few days earlier and had driven to Fort Lauderdale to meet William-
65 Id.







73 Brief for Petitioner, 1994 WL 192030 at *3-4, Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2431 (1994) (No. 93-5256).
74 Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2433.
75 Petitioner's Brief at *4, Williamson (No. 93-5256).
76 Willia7sO7, 114 S. Ct. at 2433.
77 Petitioner's Brief at *4, Williamson, (No. 93-5256).
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son.78 Harris stated that he received the cocaine from a Cuban ac-
quaintance of Williamson, and that the Cuban had put the cocaine in
the car with a note telling Harris how to deliver it79 Harris then re-
peated that he had been instructed to leave the drugs in a certain
dumpster, to return to his car, and to leave without waiting for anyone
to pick up the drugs.80
Acting on this information, Agent Walton began to arrange a de-
livery of the cocaine.8' However, as Agent Walton was preparing to
leave the interview room, Harris "got out of [his] chair ... and...
took a half step toward [Walton] ... and... said, 'I can't let you do
that.., that's not true, I can't let you go up there for no reason."'8 2
Harris told Agent Walton that he had lied about the Cuban, the note,
and the dumpster.83 The real story, Harris said, was that he was trans-
porting the cocaine to Atlanta for Williamson, and Williamson was
traveling in another rental car.8 4 Harris added that after the police
pulled him over, Williamson turned around and drove past the loca-
tion of the stop, where he could see Harris' car with its trunk open.8 5
Because Williamson had apparently seen the police searching the car,
Harris explained that it would be impossible to make a controlled
delivery.8
6
Harris told Agent Walton that he had lied about the source of the
drugs because he was afraid of Williamson.87 Although Harris freely
implicated himself, he did not want Walton to record his second story,
and he also refused to sign a written version of the statement.88 Agent
Walton testified that he had promised to report any cooperation by
Harris to the Assistant United States Attorney.8 9 However, Agent Wal-
ton testified that he had not promised Harris any reward or other
benefit for cooperating.90
Even though the prosecution gave Harris use immunity, Harris
refused to testify when the prosecution called him at Williamson's




82 Brief for Respondent, 1994 WL 106730 at *4, Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2431 (1994) (No. 93-5256).










trial.91 The court ordered Harris to testify and eventually held him in
contempt.92 In response to Harris' refusal, the district court ruled
that, under Rule 804(b) (3), Agent Walton could relate what Harris
had said to him:
The ruling of the Court is that the statements... are admissible under
[FED. R EVID. 804(b) (3)], which deals with statements made against in-
terest. First, defendant Harris' statements clearly implicated himself,
and therefore, are against his penal interest. Second, defendant Harris,
the declarant, is unavailable. And third, as I found yesterday, there are
sufficient corroborating circumstances in this case to ensure the trust-
worthiness of his testimony. Therefore, under [United States v. Harrel,
788 F.2d 1524 ([11th Cir.] 1986)] these statements by defendant Harris
implicating [Williamson] are admissible. 93
Williamson was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and
traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine. 94 The dis-
trict court sentenced Williamson to 327 months in prison, followed by
five years of supervised release. 95 Williamson appealed his conviction,
claiming that the District Court violated Rule 804(b) (3) and the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by admitting Harris' state-
ments. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
without opinion,96 and the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to determine the scope of the hearsay exception admitting
statements against interest.
97
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
In Williamson v. United States,98 the Supreme Court determined
the scope of the exception from the rule against hearsay provided
under Rule 804(b) (3) for statements inculpating the defendant and
subjecting the declarant to criminal liability. The Court issued four
opinions. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, I-A,
and II-B, in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and
Ginsburgjoined, and she authored an opinion with respect to Part II-
C, in which Justice Scaliajoined. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring




94 Respondent's Brief at *2, Wi//iamson (No. 93-5256).
95 Id.
96 United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992).
97 Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
98 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
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concurring in thejudgnent, in whichJustices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined.
The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Court of Appeals'
order admitting all of Harris' statements and remanded the case for
further proceedings.9 9 However, the Justices disagreed about two im-
portant points. First, Justices Kennedy and Thomas and Chief'Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, Black-
mun, Stevens, and Souter regarding the test trial courts should use to
determine the admissibility of statements against interest. Second, the
Justices disagreed about the application of the tests to the facts of the
case. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, as
well as Justices O'Connor and Scalia, held that some of Harris' state-
ments were admissible under their respective tests. Justices Ginsburg,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, on the other hand, stated that none
of Harris' statements were admissible, but agreed to remand the case
to allow the government to argue that the District Court's admission
of the statements was harmless error.
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S OPINION
After recanting the history of the case in Part I, Justice O'Connor,
in Parts II-A and li-B, set forth a test for determining the admissibility
of statements against penal interest and her rationale for adopting
this test.'00 Justice O'Connor adopted a narrow interpretation of
Rule 804(b) (3) and stated that "the most faithful reading of Rule
804(b) (3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is
generally self-inculpatory."' 10 UnderJustice O'Connor's formulation,
only statements that are "individually self-inculpatory" are admissible
under Rule 804(b) (3).102 Justice O'Connor's test requires district
courts to determine whether a statement is sufficiently individually
self-inculpatory, by evaluating whether "a reasonable person in the de-
clarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
it to be true," while taking the surrounding circumstances into
consideration. 103
To reach this conclusion, Justice O'Connor looked to the text of
Rule 804(b) (3). Rule 804(b) (3) admits "statement[s] which... at the
99 Id. at 2437, 2438, 2440, 2445.
100 In Part I, Justice O'Connor set forth the facts and procedural history of the case.
101 Williamon, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2437.
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time of [their] making... so far tended to subject the declarant to...
criminal liability... that a reasonable person in the declarant's posi-
tion would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to
be true."10 4 Specifically, Justice O'Connor relied on the word "state-
ment" to determine the scope of the exception. 10 5 She noted that
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (a) (1) defines "statement" as "an oral or
written assertion," but concluded that she had to look at other plain
meaning definitions of the word to resolve the issue. According to
Justice O'Connor, the word "statement" has two possible meanings. 10 6
The first meaning, "a report or narrative," 107 connotes an extended
declaration. 10 8 Under this definition, Justice O'Connor argued that
Harris' entire confession, both the self-inculpatory and non-self-incul-
patory parts, would be admissible so long as in the aggregate the con-
fession sufficiently inculpates him. 10 9 Justice O'Connor argued that
the second meaning, "a single declaration or remark,"" 0 would sug-
gest that Rule 804(b) (3) covers only those declarations or remarks
within a confession that are individually self-inculpatory."'
Although Justice O'Connor noted that the text of the Rule does
not directly resolve the issue, she concluded that the principle behind
the Rule mandated the narrower reading." 2 Justice O'Connor stated
that "Rule 804(b) (3) is founded on the common sense notion that
reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially
honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they be-
lieve them to be true."" 5 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the ration-
ale underlying the rule was not applicable to extended declarations
that contained both inculpatory and exculpatory statements, arguing
that the mere proximity of non-self-inculpatory words to self-inculpa-
tory words does not guarantee their reliability." 4 Justice O'Connor
reasoned further that, "[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly
self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confes-
sion's non-self-inculpatory parts."" 5 She argued, "[o]ne of the most
effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that
104 Id. at 2434.
105 Id. at 2434-35.
106 Id. at 2434.
107 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2229, defn. 2(a) (1961).
108 Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
109 Id. (emphasis added).
110 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2229, defn. 2(b) (1961).
111 Williamnon, 114 S. Ct. at 2434-35 (emphasis added).
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seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature."1 16
To support her conclusion, Justice O'Connor cited Lee v. Il/inois,"17
Bruton v. United States,118 and Dutton v. Evans 19 for the proposition
that courts have traditionally viewed statements of co-defendants with
suspicion due to co-defendants' desire to exonerate themselves or
curry favor with the authorities. 120 Thus, the majority concluded that
the rationale only applies to the narrow definition of "statement,"
which would result in the admission of only individually self-inculpa-
tory statements.'
21
Justice O'Connor rejected Justice Kennedy's argument that the
Advisory Committee Note suggests that an entire narrative, including
non-self-inculpatory, but excluding clearly self-serving parts, may be
admissible if it is in the aggregate self-inculpatory. 122 The Advisory
Committee Note reads, in relevant part:
[T] he third-party confession... may include statements implicating [the
accused], and under the general theory of declarations against interest
they would be admissible as related statements... [Douglas v. Alabama123
... and Bruton v. United States124 . .. ] ... by no means require[ ] that all
statements implicating another person be excluded from the category of
declarations against interest. ... On the other hand, the same words
spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would
have no difficulty in qualifying .... The balancing of the self-serving
against the dissenting [sic] aspects of a declaration is discussed in Mc-
Cormick § 256.125
Justice O'Connor interpreted the Note to be "not particularly clear"
and relied instead on the rationale underlying the rule to conclude
that collateral statements, or non-self-inculpatory statements, are not
admissible under Rule 804(b) (3).126 Justice O'Connor also rejected
Justice Kennedy's fear that this test would eviscerate the penal interest
exception or would rob it of meaningful effect.127
In Part II-C, the Court128 revoked the appellate court's order ad-
116 Id.
117 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
118 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
119 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
120 W/iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
121 1&L
122 Id.
123 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
124 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
125 Wilianmon, 114 S. Ct. at 2435-36.
126 Wtiianon, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
127 Id. Justice O'Connor provided examples of statements that would be admissible
under Rule 804(b) (3). Id. These included inculpatory statements about the declarant's
actions that could be used against accomplices and statements that could allow a jury to
infer from the declarant's statement that accomplices had knowledge about a fact. Id.
128 Justice Scaliajoined this part of the opinion.
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mitting Agent Walton's statements and remanded the case with direc-
tions to the Court of Appeals to analyze the admissibility of each of
Agent Walton's statements in light of the test outlined in Part II-B. 129
Justice O'Connor concluded that some, but not all, of Harris' state-
ments would be admissible.' 30 Justice O'Connor noted that the state-
ments implicating Williamson were to be the most questionable.' 31
Again, the majority emphasized that the determination was fact-inten-
sive and required careful consideration of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the criminal activity involved.'3 2
Because the Court remanded the case to the district court for
further factual inquiry into whether Harris' statements were truly self-
inculpatory, Justice O'Connor refused to address Williamson's claim
that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause, and that the hearsay exception for declarations against inter-
est is "firmly rooted" for Confrontation Clause purposes.' 33 She also
declined to address Williamson's contention that statements inculpat-
ing the accused must be supported by corroborating circumstances.13 4
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia stated that the crucial inquiry under Rule 804(b) (3)
is whether a particular remark at issue (and not the extended narra-
ive) meets the standard set forth in the rule. 3 5 Thus, to be admissi-
ble, a statement against interest must "so far tend[ ] to subject the
declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declar-
ant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true."13 6 Justice Scalia referred strictly to the text of the rule and
refused to consider classifications such as "collateral self-serving" and
"collateral neutral" in making the determination. 3 7
Justice Scalia agreed withJustice O'Connor that the Court's hold-
ing did not obliterate the penal interest exception to the hearsay
rule. 38 To show that certain statements, while not a confession to a
crime, could be admissible as against the declarant's penal interest,
Justice Scalia argued that statements describing events leading up to
the commission of a crime would be admissible based on the sur-
129 Wil!iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.





135 Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
138 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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rounding circumstances in which the declarant made the state-
ments.1 39 Along the same lines, Justice Scalia argued that statements
that name another person as a co-defendant are not automatically
inadmissible.' 40 However, Justice Scalia clarified that to be admissi-
ble, a declarant who names another person as a co-defendant must
not have been acting with the intent to minimize liability.141
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg joined in Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the Court's
opinion. 142 Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court that Rule
804(b) (3) provides an exception from the general rule that hearsay is
inadmissible only for "those declarations or remarks within [a narra-
tive] that are individually self-inculpatory." 143 Justice Ginsburg en-
dorsed this ruling to ensure the reliability of statements implicating
another person.'4
However, unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the Court of Appeals should not have admitted any of Harris'
statements as recounted by Agent Walton.145 Justice Ginsburg argued
that Harris' "arguably inculpatory" statements were too closely inter-
twined with his self-serving declarations to be trustworthy.'40 Justice
Ginsburg cited several facts that she felt detracted from the reliability
of Harris' statements. First, she concluded that the fact that Harris
did not deny the existence of the drugs was not against his penal inter-
est.147 To the contrary, because the police caught Harris red-handed,
with enough cocaine to subject him to twelve-and-one-half years of
imprisonment, Justice Ginsburg argued that Harris' denial of knowl-
edge would have done little to help him avoid criminal prosecu-
tion. 148 Second, Justice Ginsburg noted that many of Harris'
statements focused on Williamson's actions to minimize Harris' own
role in the crime. 149 Third, although Harris admitted that he had pre-
viously lied, in his second statement of the facts Harris continued to
depict Williamson as the leader of the operation. 50 Justice Ginsburg
139 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
140 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
142 wziamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2438 (GinsburgJ., concurring). Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter joined injustice Ginsburg's concurring opinion.
143 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 2439 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
145 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146 ME (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
147 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
148 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
149 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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concluded that, although these statements were incriminatory, they
provided only marginal or cumulative evidence of his guilt.151
For these reasons, Justice Ginsburg concluded that she would not
have admitted any of Harris' statements. 152 However, because she had
not reviewed the entire record, Justice Ginsburg concurred with the
Court's judgment to vacate the Court of Appeals' decision. 15 Justice
Ginsburg stated that the Government should have the opportunity to
argue on appeal that the erroneous admission of the hearsay state-
ments constituted harmless error.1 54
D. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy' 55 agreed with the opinion of the Court and the
other concurrences that the rationale behind Rule 804(b) (3) is that
people seldom make statements that are damaging to themselves un-
less they believe the statements to be true.156 However, in his concur-
rence, Justice Kennedy framed the issue presented in different terms
than the preceding three opinions. According to Justice Kennedy, the
issue presented by the case was whether courts may admit "collateral
statements" under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements
made against interest. 157 Justice Kennedy described "collateral state-
ments" as those related to, but not directly against, the declarant's
interest.1
58
Because the text of the Rule does not answer the question,Justice
Kennedy traced the debate among commentators over the admissibil-
ity of collateral statements. 159 Justice Kennedy first cited Dean Wig-
more's position in favor of admissibility, which argued that "the
statement may be accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against
interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same statement."
160
151 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
152 Id. at 2440 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also argued that none of
Harris' statements were admissible under the exception for statements made by a co-con-
spirator (Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)). Id. Rule 801(d) (2) (E) reads:
Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if- (2) Admissions by
Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is... (E) a statement by
a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (E).
155 Id.
154 Id.
155 Justices Rehnquist and Thomas joined in Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
156 Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2440 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy cited the example "I shot the bank
teller" as a statement against interest and the statement "John Doe drove the getaway car"
as a collateral, but related statement. Id.
159 Id. at 2441 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1100 [Vol. 85
1ED. R EVD. 804(b)(3)
Second, Justice Kennedy described Dean McCormick's more qualified
approach that courts should admit "neutral" collateral statements, but
not "self-serving" statements. 61 Third, Justice Kennedy explained
that Professor Jefferson took the narrowest approach, arguing that
courts may admit statements against interest that pertain only to the
proof of the fact that is against interest. 62 Under Jefferson's ap-
proach, Justice Kennedy argued that neither neutral nor self-serving
collateral statements were admissible.' 63
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court adopted Jefferson's ap-
proach, the strictest interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3). Justice Ken-
nedy rejected the Court's conclusion that the policy of Rule 804(b) (3)
precluded the admission of collateral statements. To the contrary, he
argued that the existing authorities suggested that some collateral
statements were admissible. In support of his argument, Justice Ken-
nedy cited three sources of authority: (1) the Advisory Committee
Note; (2) the common law hearsay exception for statements against
interest; and (3) the general presumption that Congress does not en-
act statutes that have no meaning. 64
First, Justice Kennedy argued that the Advisory Committee Note
(Committee Note) established that some collateral statements are ad-
missible. He cited the language of the Committee Note as a forthright
admission that some collateral statements are admissible. 65 The
Committee Note reads:
[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpat-
ing the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it
may include statements implicating him, and under the general theory
of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related
statements. 1
66
Justice Kennedy maintained that where, as here, the text of a rule
does not answer a question relative to how courts should apply the
rule of evidence, the Court should look to the Committee Note for
guidance. 16
7
Second, Justice Kennedy argued that even if the Committee Note
was silent, the Court should not presume that Congress intended to
enact legislation in contrast to the existing common law without mak-
161 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
162 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
164 Id. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing FED. M. EvD. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's
note, 28 U.S.C. app. at 790-92).
167 Id. (Kennedy J., concurring).
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ing that intent specific.168 Kennedy argued that the Committee Note
reflects the existing "general theory" that collateral statements were
admissible, and thus is an indication that the Rule followed the com-
mon law. 169 Justice Kennedy concluded that, although the Rule is si-
lent on the issue, Congress legislated against the common law
background allowing the admission of some collateral statements, and
did not intend to give the common law a silent burial.170
Third, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's interpretation of
the Rule would cause courts to exclude almost all statements inculpat-
ing defendants.' 7 ' Justice Kennedy conceded that the Court's deci-
sion would allow the rule to apply to a limited number of situations;
however, he concluded that it would be rare to find a case in which
the precise self-inculpatory words of the declarant would also incul-
pate the defendant 72 Justice Kennedy argued that Congress would
not pass a rule that had such a small effect.'75
Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) allows
courts to admit statements that are collateral to the precise words
against the declarant's interest.174 However, to determine whether all
collateral statements related to the statement against interest would
be admissible under Rule 804(b) (3), Justice Kennedy looked to the
Committee Note. 175 Because the Committee Note cites McCormick's
treatise, Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) excludes self-
serving collateral statements, but allows neutral collateral state-
ments.' 76 McCormick states that within a declaration containing
both self-serving and disserving parts, he would "admit the disserving
parts of the declaration, and exclude the self-serving parts" at least
"where the serving and disserving parts can be severed." 177 In addi-
tion to excluding collateral, self-serving statements, Justice Kennedy
argued that the admissibility of statements made to the authorities
should be limited under Rule 804(b) (3) to avoid relying upon state-
ments made to curry favor.' 78 Thus, if a declarant makes a statement
in response to a promise of leniency, the statement is admissible.' 79
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that such a rule required judicial dis-
168 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 2443 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 2444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cretion. He concluded, however, that judicial line drawing was neces-
sary to avoid excluding all statements made to the police.'
8 0
Finally, justice Kennedy outlined his approach to determine
whether courts may admit statements under Rule 804(b) (3). Accord-
ing to Justice Kennedy, a court should first determine whether the
declarant made a statement that contained a fact against penal inter-
est. 81 If the court makes such a finding, it should admit all state-
ments related to the precise statement against penal interest, subject
to two limitations.'8 2 The court should exclude a collateral statement
that is so self-serving as to render it unreliable. 83 In addition, in cases
where the statement was made under circumstances where it is likely
that the declarant had a significant motivation to obtain favorable
treatment, the entire statement should be inadmissible. 8 4 Justice
Kennedy concluded that the decision is at the discretion of the district
court judge and must depend on the circumstances of the case. 185
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly determined
that collateral statements (even those that are neutral) do not fall
within the scope of Rule 804(b) (3)'s exception to the rule against
hearsay for statements against penal interest. In Part A, this Note
compares the standards of admissibility announced in the majority
opinion and injustice Kennedy's concurrence and applies the varying
standards to specific fact patterns to compare and contrast the results
derived from each standard. This Note argues that Justice
O'Connor's majority approach best reflects the principles underlying
Rule 804(b) (3) and adequately ensures the reliability of statements
against penal interest. In Part B, this Note discusses some questions
the Williamson decision left unresolved and discusses a subsequent
case involving statements against interest.
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S APPROACH BEST ENSURES THE RELIABILITY OF
STATEMENTS ADMITTED UNDER RULE 804(b) (3)
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the scope of
Rule 804(b) (3).186 All of the Justices agreed that clearly self-serving or
self-exculpatory out-of-court statements may not qualify as sufficiently
180 Id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
185 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
186 Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1994).
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against interest to ensure reliability. 187 Similarly, all of the Justices
agreed that statements that singly inculpate the declarant are admissi-
ble under Rule 804(b) (3).188 The crucial point of contention be-
tween the majority approach and Justice Kennedy's concurrence
concerned the admissibility of "neutral" or "non-self-inculpatory"
statements that are collateral to the precisely self-inculpatory words
(collateral statements).189
Justice O'Connor held that Rule 804(b) (3) does not allow the
admission of collateral statements. 190 According to the majority ap-
proach, to be admissible under Rule 804(b) (3), statements must be
sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest "that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true."191 To determine whether a statement is
self-inculpatory, it is necessary to view it in context. 192
Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that
Rule 804(b) (3) allows admission of collateral statements. 93 Under
Justice Kennedy's approach, a court must first determine whether the
statement contains a fact against penal interest. 94 If the court makes
such a finding, the court should admit all statements related to the
precise statement against penal interest, except statements that are
self-serving and statements made to curry favor with the authorities. 195
Justice Kennedy also stressed that courts should consider the circum-
stances of the case in making this determination. 196
To compare the practical consequences of the two standards, it
may be helpful to analyze statements under both standards. For ex-
ample, one of Justice O'Connor's hypotheticals involved the state-
ment, "Sam and I went to Joe's house."197 According to Justice
O'Connor's reasoning, this statement may be against the declarant's
interest if a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize
that being linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe
187 Id. at 2435, 2439 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at 2444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2440.
190 Id. at 2435.
191 Id. at 2437.
192 Id. at 2436. For a more detailed discussion ofJustice O'Connor's rationale in adopt-
ing this standard, see supra notes 100 to 133 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia and
Justice Ginsburg adopted the standard set forth by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2437 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 2438 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 2443 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194 I. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
195 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
196 I. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197 Id at 2437.
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and Sam's conspiracy. 98 Justice Kennedy would likely agree that the
statement would subject the declarant to criminal liability. Conse-
quently, assuming that the statement was not self-serving, and that the
declarant did not make it to curry favor with the authorities, Justice
Kennedy would admit the entire statement.199 In this example, the
Justices probably would reach the same conclusion that the entire
statement was admissible. This result may not be surprising in light of
the fact that all of the Justices were primarily concerned about the
same risks in regard to statements against interest-the possibility that
the declarant made the statements to curry favor with the authorities
and the risk that the declarant made the statements to shift the blame
for the crime.
20 0
However, under other circumstances, such as the Williamson case
itself, the two approaches might yield quite different results. In Wil-
liamson, Harris asserted that he had been transporting the cocaine to
Atlanta for Williamson, and that Williamson was traveling in the car in
front of him.201 Harris also stated that after he stopped his car, Wil-
liamson turned around and drove past the location of the stop, where
he could see Harris' car with its trunk open.202 Because Williamson
had apparently seen the police searching the car, Harris explained
that it would be impossible to deliver the drugs as originally
planned.203
Justice O'Connor remanded the case for further factual determi-
nations.20 4 However, based on the facts as stated in the case, Justice
O'Connor suggested that the portions of the statement in which Har-
ris forfeited his only defense, lack of knowledge that the cocaine was
in the trunk, would be admissible as statements against penal inter-
est.20 5 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor questioned the reliability
of the portions of the statement in which Harris implicated William-
son.20 6 Justice O'Connor feared that "[a] reasonable person in Har-
ris' [s] position might even think that implicating someone else would
decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability."207 From these
remarks, it seems that Justice O'Connor would admit only the state-
ments in which Harris made allegations that directly subjected him to
198 Id.
199 See id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 2431, 2439 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 2433.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 I. at 2437-38.





criminal liability, and would not admit any of the statements involving
Williamson.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment because he too be-
lieved that the Court should remand the case.2 08 To determine which
portions of Harris' statement would be admissible, Justice Kennedy
would first determine whether the statement, presumably as a whole,
contained statements against interest.2 09 In this case, the statement
meets the first requirement because Harris admitted that he knew co-
caine was in the trunk and because he acknowledged his participation
in the transportation of drugs.
Next, Justice Kennedy would determine whether Harris' state-
ment was overly self-serving or whether Harris made it to shift the
blame for the crime.210 Perhaps Justice Kennedy would not admit the
portion of the statement in which Harris stated that he was delivering
the drugs for Williamson, fearing that Harris was trying to shift the
blame for the crime. However, he might consider the other portions
of the statement, in which Harris stated that Williamson was driving in
front of him in another car and that Williamson turned around when
Harris was pulled over, neutral as to Harris' interest, and therefore
admit them as collateral statements. These statements may be consid-
ered neutral because they neither appear to minimize the fact that
Harris had the drugs in his car nor attempt to describe Williamson as
the owner of the drugs.21' From this hypothetical application of Jus-
tice Kennedy's standard of admissibility under Rule 804(b) (3), it
seems that Justice Kennedy would admit a larger portion of the state-
ment than Justice O'Connor.
These comparisons demonstrate that application of the two stan-
dards to particular facts may yield different results. The question then
becomes which standard creates results consistent with the statutory
directive of Rule 804(b) (3) and the policies underlying the rule. Jus-
tice O'Connor properly focused her analysis on whether statements
collateral to the specific statement against interest have sufficient
guarantees of reliability. The general rule against hearsay, that out-of-
court statements presented at trial to prove the truth of matters as-
serted are inadmissible, is based on a basic concern for reliability.
212
However, the Federal Rules of Evidence make an exception for out-of-
court statements that are necessary and bear circumstantial proof of
208 Id. at 2445. UnlikeJustice O'Connor's opinion,Justice Kennedy did not provide any
analysis regarding the facts involved in the case.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See id. at 2435.
212 V WMoRk, supra note 10. See also Davenport, supra note 12.
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trustworthiness. 21 3 Accordingly, the exception to the rule against
hearsay for statements against penal interest (made by an unavailable
witness) is based on the rationale that "a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement[s] unless be-
lieving [them] to be true."2 1 4 On the issue of collateral statements,
Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he fact that a statement is self-incul-
patory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is col-
lateral to a self-inculpatory statements says nothing at all about the
collateral statement's reliability."215 By admitting only siatements that
are individually self-inculpatory, Justice O'Connor's interpretation of
Rule 804(b) (3) requires lower courts to focus on the factor that ren-
ders statements against interest reliable-the self-inculpatory effect of
the declarant's words. Justice O'Connor's standard creates results
consistent with the rationale of Rule 804(b) (3)'s exception to the rule
against hearsay.
Justice Kennedy's approach, on the other hand, extends the
scope of Rule 804(b) (3)'s exception to the rule against hearsay be-
yond the rationale that underlies the rule.2 1 6 As Justice O'Connor
noted, "[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory
confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-in-
culpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix false-
hood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive
because of its self-inculpatory nature."217 Absent the exception for
statements against interest, the entire statement in Williamson would
be inadmissible as hearsay, based on the rationale that the statement
was not protected by the precautions available at trial. As noted, the
exception for statements against interest is based on the rationale that
people do not make statements against their interest unless they be-
lieve them to be true.2 18 This rationale serves as a surrogate for the in-
213 IlA WIGMORE, supira note 10, § 1420.
214 FmD. R. EviD. 804(b) (3).
215 Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
216 Justice Kennedy argued that "[b]ecause the text of Rule 804(b) (3) expresses no posi-
tion regarding the admissibility of collateral statements, we must determine whether there
are other authoritative guides on the question." Williaason, 114 S. Ct. at 2442 (KennedyJ.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy then argued that the question regarding the admissibility of
collateral statements should be answered by reference to outside sources. Id- (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (for a summary ofJustice Kennedy's argument see supra notes 155 to 184 and
accompanying text). The rule against hearsay sets forth a negative presumption against
out-of-court statements. FED. R. EVID. 802. Justice Kennedy's reference to outside sources
ignores the presumption that out-of-court statements are not admissible unless they fall
under an exception to the rule against hearsay. See iL. Contrary to justice Kennedy's sug-
gestion, Rule 804(b) (3)'s silence regarding the admissibility of collateral statements favors
excluding such statements. See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
217 Id at 2435.
218 FED. P, Evm. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. at 789.
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court procedures that -guarantee reliability and trustworthiness.21 9
Thus, there is no reason, absent explicit guidance in the text (or in
the Advisory Committee Notes), to admit statements that otherwise
would be considered hearsay simply because they are collateral to
statements against interest.220 Applying Justice Kennedy's approach
would result in an outcome not contemplated by the text of the rule.
B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING THE WILLIA MSON STANDARD
Justice O'Connor adopts a narrow interpretation of Rule
804(b) (3). However, her opinion may present some practical
problems for courts trying to apply her standard. A discussion of a
district court opinion issued after the Court's decision in Williamson
illustrates some of the problems involved in determining what por-
tions of an extended declaration are admissible as statements against
penal interest.
In Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, InCm.22 former executives of
the defendant company filed a civil action, alleging that the defend-
ant had breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA222 to provide retire-
ment benefits. 223 The relevant issue for Rule 804(b) (3) purposes was
whether an affidavit of Mr. Woodend, the retired vice president of the
defendant company, was admissible at trial 2 24 The court presented
the issue by stating,
The issue here is not whether the affidavit contains statements against
interest butjust how wide a net the exception casts. Put more succinctly,
does the exception render admissible only those portions of sentences
that specifically inculpate Mr. Woodend or does it also include the re-
mainders of those sentences, including references to others?
225
The court concluded that Mr. Woodend's affidavit contained state-
ments against interest because in it he essentially admitted that he had
219 Id.
220 Justice Kennedy argues that the following text of the Advisory Committee Note is a
"forthright statement that collateral statements are admissible under Rule 804(b) (3)":
"[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused,
but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicat-
ing him, and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be ad-
missible as related statements." Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2442. From this quote, Justice
Kennedy seems to conclude that the rationale behind Rule 804(b) (3) applies to collateral
statements. On the contrary, the quote merely seems to acknowledge that third-party state-
ments may be used both by the prosecution to inculpate the defendant and the defense to
exculpate the defendant depending on the content of the statement against interest.
221 No. CIV. A.1: CV-93-643, 1994 WL 483873 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1994).
222 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1100.
223 Ciccarelli, 1994 WL 483873 at *2.
224 Id. at *4. Because the relevant paragraphs of the affidavit were confidential, the
court referred to only the individual paragraphs involved.
225 rd.
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defrauded a company and had subjected himself to a suit by that com-
pany as well as a forfeiture of his pension.226 The court then recog-
nized that the issue was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in
Williamson.2
27
The court in Ciccarelli noted that it could read Williamson in one
of two ways:
The first would be that, in a statement of several sentences, some of
which are self-inculpatory and some of which are not, the sentences that
are self-inculpatory are admissible-even if they contain nonsef-inculpa-
tory references-and the other sentences are not. As an example, in the
following statement, the entire second sentence would be admissible
under the rule but the first would not be: "Derek purchased the gun.
Then, he and I robbed Kenneth." Under such a formulation, those
sentences within the Woodend affidavit that implicate Mr. Woodend and
Plaintiffs in wrongdoing would be admissible, with the references to
Plaintiffs being, in some sense, res gestae.
The other way we could interpret Williamson is that only those words
that are actually self-inculpatory fit within the Rule 804(b) (3) exception.
Thus, a sentence that is generally self-inculpatory might have portions
that are collateral and inadmissible. For example, in the following sen-
tence, only the parts referring to culpable conduct by the declarant
would be admissible: "Matthew, Derek, and I robbed Kenneth." The
references to Matthew and Derek would have to be redacted. If this
were the teaching of Williamson, any references in the Woodend affida-
vit to persons other than Mr. Woodend would be inadmissible. 228
The court in Ciccarelli adopted the second, more narrow, interpreta-
tion of Williamson.
229
The court in Ciccarelli stated three reasons why it believed the
more narrow interpretation of Williamson was correct. First, because
the Supreme Court held that the rationale behind statements against
interest did not apply to collateral statements, the court in Ciccarelli
concluded that the Supreme Court could not have intended the fortu-
ity of sentence structure to dictate admissibility.230 Second, the court
cited several examples in the Williamson opinion that bolstered its own
interpretation of Williamson.231 The court concluded that " [a ]Ill of the
examples of permissible statements are ones in which only the declar-
ant is implicated-none involve naming third parties."232 Third, the
226 Id.
227 Id. The court in Ciccarelli stated that the Supreme Court in Williamson held that
"[w]e see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are neutral as to interest,...
should be treated any differently than other hearsay statements that are generally ex-
cluded." Id. at *5.
228 Id. at *5.
229 Id.
230 Id




court stated that Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggested that the
majority found that "the exception [was] so narrow as to apply only to
the particular words that are against the declarant's interest."23 3 The
court in Ciccarelli concluded that, according to Williamson, the only
portions of the affidavit that were admissible were those that specifi-
cally referred to Mr. Woodend, not those that referred to any other
persons.234
The court's opinion in Ciccarelli highlights the portions of the Wil-
liamson opinion that may cause confusion. The court properly under-
stood Williamson to permit only those statements that individually
inculpate the declarant to be admitted against a defendant under
Rule 804(b) (3). However, because the Williamson standard, which de-
fined "statement" as an assertion that is individually self-inculpatory,
does not, in and of itself, provide an easily applied standard for lower
courts, the court in Ciccarelli determined that for Rule 804(b) (3) pur-
poses "statement" could either refer to a single word or to a larger
grammatical unit, such as a sentence. The court in Ciccarelli deter-
mined that the Supreme Court intended a narrow analysis under Wil-
liamson and therefore determined that only the "words" that are self-
inculpatory are admissible against a defendant.
The court properly determined that the Court in Williamson
adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3); however, the
court further narrowed the Supreme Court's holding to apply to indi-
vidually self-inculpatory words.235 Although Justice O'Connor nar-
rowly defined the word "statement" as "a single remark or
declaration,"23 6 for Rule 804(b) (3) purposes, she began her analysis
by recognizing that the Federal Rules of Evidence define "statement"
more generally as "an oral or written assertion."23 7 Contrary to the
court's decision in Ciccarelli, Justice O'Connor did not suggest that
"statement" referred to individual words.238 Instead of focusing on
individual words or on sentences (the two options put forth by the
court in Ciccarelh), a better approach might be to focus on phrases
within the statement. This would coincide with Justice O'Connor's
narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3) and would surround admissi-
233 Id.
284 Id.
235 See FED. P. EvID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. at 790-92.
236 Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434 (1994).
237 Id
238 However, Justice Kennedy's discussion of McCormick's Treatise on Evidence focuses
on the character of individual words. Id at 2441 ("For example, in the statement 'John
and I robbed the bank,' the words 'John and' are neutral (save for the possibility of con-
spiracy charges). On the other hand, the statement, 'John, not I, shot the bank teller' is to
some extent self-serving and therefore might be inadmissible."). Id.
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ble statements with enough context to render them intelligible at
trial. By focusing on individual words, courts could edit statements so
that they would become meaningless, irrelevant, or both.
23 9
The court in Ciccarelli ignored or misconstrued other important
aspects of the Court's holding in Williamson. First, the court in Cic-
carelli suggested that the Court adopted a per se rule against the ad-
missibility of statements against the declarant's interest that also
inculpate other persons.240 Although the petitioner in Williamson
asked the Supreme Court to adopt a per se rule regarding statements
against interest,24 1 the Court declined to do so.242 The Court con-
ceded that statements that inculpate someone other than the declar-
ant have been traditionally viewed with suspicion. However, instead of
ruling that such statements are never admissible, the Court decided to
rely on the rationale underlying Rule 804(b) (3), that people do not
make statements against their penal interest unless they believe they
are true, to guarantee the reliability of out-of-court statements.
243
Contrary to the court's reasoning in Ciccarelli, one of Justice
O'Connor's examples of admissible statements, "Sam and I went to
Joe's house,"244 clearly refers to a person other than the declarant.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that this statement might be against the
declarant's interest if a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes
would realize that being linked to Joe's and Sam would implicate the
declarant in Joe and Sam's conspiracy.
245
This example also underscores the Ciccarelli court's second mis-
take. The court did not follow Justice O'Connor's instruction that
courts must look at the surrounding circumstances and view the state-
ments in context to determine whether they are individually admissi-
239 Take, for example, Justice O'Connor's hypothetical statement, "Sam and I went to
Joe's house." Id. at 2437. Under the court's reasoning in Cicarelli (that only individually
inculpatory words without reference to other actors may be admissible), the references to
Sam andJoe would have to be redacted, leaving "I went to house." This statement makes
no sense and it is difficult to imagine a hypothetical in which it could be used against or in
favor of a third party defendant.
240 See Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc., No. CIV.A.1:CV-93-643, 1994 WL
483873, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1994). The court in Ciccareli stated that "According to
Wir!iamson, the only portions of that paragraph that are admissible are those that specifi-
cally refer to Mr. Woodend, not those that refer to any other persons." Id.
241 Petitioner's Brief, 1994 WL 192030 at *3-4, Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2431 (1994) (No. 93-5256).
242 See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434-35.
243 Id at 2435.
244 Id. at 2437.
245 Id. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia explicitly noted that "a declarant's statement is
not magically transformed from a statement against penal interest into one that is inadmis-
sible merely because the declarant names another person or implicates a possible code-
fendant." Id. at 2438.
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ble.246 Instead, the court looked only to the text of the affidavit. 247
Regardless, because the Supreme Court did not explicitly define what
constitutes the proper "context" or "surrounding circumstances," it is
foreseeable that lower courts may limit their inquiry to the text of the
statement itself. Justice O'Connor's examples go against this ap-
proach and suggest that courts should inquire into factual circum-
stances surrounding the making of the larger statement, not merely
the sentences surrounding the statement against interest itself.2 48
As the Ciccarelli decision illustrates, the problems posed by state-
ments against penal interest may cause confusion for parties attempt-
ing to implement the exception as well as for courts attempting to
determine the admissibility of statements. Practitioners and prosecu-
tors would be wise to note the impact that the Williamson decision may
have on lower court decisions in their jurisdiction. Because Justice
O'Connor adopted a narrow approach to Rule 804(b) (3), several past
lower court cases may be called into question or overruled by the Wil-
liamson decision. Practitioners and prosecutors should also note that
collateral statements may be admissible under the catch-all exception
of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (5) if the statements bear circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
249
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor properly determined that Rule 804(b) (3) does
not allow the admission of collateral statements, even if they are con-
tained within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. By
adopting a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3), the majority cor-
rectly concluded that only those statements that are individually self-
inculpatory are admissible as statements against interest. This conclu-
246 See id. at 2436.
247 See Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc., No. CIVA.l: CV-93-643, 1994 WL
483873 at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept, 6 1994).
248 See Wi!/iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436-37. On this issue, Justice O'Connor stated,
Moreover, whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by
viewing it in context. Even statements that are on their face neutral may actually be
against the declarant's interest. "I hid the gun in Joe's apartment" may not be a con-
fession of a crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder weapon, then it
is certainly self-inculpatory... And other statements that give the police significant
details about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant's
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
This language suggests that courts should consider the case as a whole when determining
whether a statement is against interest instead of looking solely at the individually self-
inculpatory statement in the context of the larger statement. In addition, Justice
O'Connor's concern about the risk that the declarant made the statement to curry favor or
shift blame suggests that courts must consider the surrounding facts.
249 See Wil/iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437 n.1.
1112 [Vol. 85
1995] TED. R. EVLD. 804(b)(3) 1113
sion is in line with the rationale underlying Rule 804(b) (3) and fol-
lows the statutory directive of the Rule.
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